Our meetings got more granular and specific the next day, with sessions lead by Yuichi Oda, Deputy Director of Defense Policy Division, Shingo Yamagami, Ambassador for Policy Planning and International Security, and several other officials. The first session began with an overview of Japan’s formal National Security Strategy policy, which to my mind seemed to be following the US model of threat assessment and strategic response - with budgetary concerns often being the tail wagging the dog.In the Japanese version, this took the form of a new policy guidance for a Dynamic Joint Defense Force,which unlike previous ones based on minimum force necessary for self defense, now appeared to be transforming (my interpretation) towards new strategies of collective dissuasion and prevention. The strategic response, in turn, entails the maintenance of air and sea superiority, more flexible joint command and training (allied interoperability) and increased capacity for a rapid response (that looked to be a marine corps equivalent?). The trope of ‘power vacuum’ was repeated more than once, as the rationale and risk should a more forward-leaning defense posture not be taken. I noted that the language of‘threats’ and ‘contingencies’ was squeezing out earlier defense-speak of ‘disaster relief’ and ‘stability’.Interestingly, outer space and cyberspace were presented as new and linked security issues, critical not just for Japan but for its allies, perhaps even more so than North Korea (and natural disasters). In one of the more revealing and frank moments, the 2009 Australia Defense White Paper was described as‘clumsy’, in the sense of unnecessarily ruffling the feathers of the Chinese (in the hope that the next one will be less so?).

A very detailed analysis of the Senkaku/Diayou Island debate was presented, from the ‘terra nullus’policies of the late 19th century to the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 to the Japan-China Summit Meeting in November 2014: highly informative but not terribly convincing because of its black/white,good guy/bad guy style of presentation.

Based on impressions left from these session, the position of the current regime could be summarized as:1) Global interdependence produces new opportunities as well as vulnerabilities; which means 2) No nation can maintain its own peace and security alone; 3) a proactive contribution to peace must be based on the principle of international cooperation; 4) and the right of collective self defense must be asserted; but 5) in a limited manner when Japan faces an existential threat; and 6) that this does not necessarily entail a reciprocal obligation when an ally faces a similar existential threat; and 5) Japan will never become a country that would wage war again.

There were obviously some ambiguities and contradictions in these positions, which were pointed out in the Q and A. Discussion also included: the legacy of anti-colonialism on Chinese and Japanese foreign policy (as source of affinity or enmity); whether the lesson of WW2 was not to fight - or not ever to fight and lose again; and whether Japan and China were engaged in a ‘beauty pageant’ with the US. The overall impression left by this session was that Japan was at a crossroads and some critical decisions and strategic transformations were needed to avoid what were perceived as possibly catastrophic outcomes.

The session at NIDS was easily the most illuminating, largely because of the open format, an interesting convergence of topical issues and the intellectual firepower that had been assembled, including Yoshio Katayama, Katsuya Tsukamoto, Tomohiko Satake and Iida Masafumi, among others. That day it had been announced, hard on the heels of the killing of two Japanese hostages by of ISIS, that a referendum would be held on Article 9 of the Japanese constitution for the possible extension of self- to a collectivedefense.The question on everyone’s mind was whether public opinion would support the change in the face of a volatile global situation, indeed, of new vulnerability for allies of the US. Opinion was split in the room on whether the constitution needed amendment to meet Japan’s current security needs, with the division pivoting on the concept of a ‘normalized policy’, and what this meant, not only for the use and level of force that could be used in other countries, but on more banal matters like joint training with other countries. The examples of cyberspace and outer space were brought up again, this time in the context of Article 9: what constitutes offensive and defensive behaviour in these realms?

Questions were also raised on whether the transition from the post-war defense system would cause tensions not only with China and Korea but the US and Australia. My query on how Japan would rank or prioritize security threats also produced something of a consensus in the room if not a total alignment with the worldview of present and potential allies/partners. The rise of China and the persistent and unpredictable threat of North Koreas topped the rankings; but this did beg the question of what kind of China might rise, especially if facing what it perceived to be encirclement by non-friendly powers; and how the build-up of missile defense against Korea would be interpreted by China.

Submarines once again punctuated the session, this time on the numbers needed, and whether an increase from 16 to 22 would increase their deterrent value or provoke an increase in spending and more aggressive anti-submarine capability by China. This triggered an interesting debate on the substantial vs. symbolic value of a potential Australian-Japanese submarine agreement, and how it would play in Australian politics as the prime minister faced growing opposition both inside and outside the party.

The expedition to Kyoto provided an appealing mix of mindfulness, first from Hiroshi Nakanishi,Professor of International Politics, at the University of Kyoto, and then from Takafumi Kawakami,Deputy Head Priest of the Zen Buddhist Shunkoin Temple.

Professor Nakanishi provided an analytical appraisal of current Japanese defense and foreign policies,which he described as a strategic shift - as much subconscious and as conscious - from the Northeast toward the Southwest, with both a geopolitical impetus (the retreat of a Russian threat from East Asia with the rise of Korean and Chinese power) as well as an ideological rationale (presented not as‘historical revisionism’ but as a nationalist rivalry). This was complemented if not offset by an increasing engagement in the Pacific and Southeast Asia and pan-Indian Ocean areas, with a focus on humanitarian security, maritime defense, defense equipment sales, and development cooperation. This might not amount to a new ‘grand strategy’ but it does suggest a conscious understanding of where Japan’s strategy should go over the next decade or so. This view enjoys, evidently, the tacit consent of the public. Interestingly, Nakanishi interpreted Abe’s ‘two seas’ position as representing (more than in the past) an Indo-Pacific shift (not unlike Australia’s) even if Asia and the US still dominate current Japanese trade and strategic interests.

After the high-speed travel and intellectual intensity of the week, the trip to the Shunkoin Temple and a meditation session with Takafumi Kawakami provided a welcome respite. I intend to return.