Japan’s Stake

Japan is not a South-China-Sea (SCS) littoral state and does not have territorial claims there. Nonetheless, Japan has asserted that it is a stakeholder in SCS maritime disputes, including over maritime sovereign rights and small remote physical features (islands, rocks, reefs) claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. Tokyo points to the importance of the SCS as a Sea Lane of Communication (SLOC) for commerce as giving it a stake in how these disputes are resolved. SLOC security does give Japan (and other non-littoral states, including the United States and South Korea) a legitimate stake in the outcome of maritime security in the SCS, even though there are readily available substitute SLOCs (e.g. east of the Philippines, through the Lombok and Sunda straits, etc.).

Nonetheless, beneath the surface of Japan’s stated claim for being a stakeholder are other reasons, including counter-balancing China’s rise, and above all the implications of SCS dispute management and resolution for the East China Sea (ECS), specifically regarding the Sino-Japanese sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku (China calls them the Diaoyu) islands and other sovereign rights in the ECS, particularly the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) border with China. It would not be an exaggeration to claim the ECS, and especially the Senkaku dispute, is the primary lense through which Japan views its interests in the SCS.
 

Japan’s Approach

Japan’s pursuit of its national interest, the SCS, focuses on several tools: multilateralism, Coast Guard cooperation, and military exercises. Japan emerged as a leader in promoting regional security multilateralism at the end of the Cold War, when it proposed establishing East Asia’s first regional multilateral security forum, leading to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. Japan subsequently played a leadership role in establishing other security related regional multilateral frameworks, including the East Asian Summit in 2005, ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus Dialogue Partners (ADMM Plus) forum in 2010, and most directly related to the SCS, the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) in 2012. Japan has used these multilateral forums to engage with, and sometimes politically balance against, China regarding its SCS policies.

Japan’s involvement has not only been China focused. Around the turn of the century Japan used the ARF to help build consensus on the need for a multilateral response to the scourge of piracy, which was afflicting the SCS and adjacent Straits of Malacca. Japan’s leadership culminated in the establishment of a regional institution: the Regional Cooperation on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (ReCAAP), and the establishment of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC) in Singapore in 2007, which provides real-time information about threats to shipping from piracy and other dangers.

Building on Coast Guard cooperation through ReCAAP, Japan has, since 2011, expanded Coast Guard and naval cooperation with Vietnam and especially the Philippines based on new strategic partnerships. Japan has transferred coast guard vessels to both countries, supplying radar and repurposed ASDF trainer aircraft for use as maritime surveillance planes to the Philippines. Japan’s support for the Philippines, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Indonesia has focused on helping those countries develop maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to enable real-time awareness of potential maritime threats, especially efforts by China to unilaterally change the status quo through fait accompli. This approach is a long-term response to China’s success in stealthily taking Mischief Reef from the Philippines in 1995 before Manila noticed.

Japan has also increasingly joined other like-minded countries in conducting naval exercises in the SCS, including with the US, Philippines, Vietnam, and Australia. Japan recently concluded a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with the Philippines that facilities the deployment of the two countries’ militaries to each other’s territory for joint exercises. Although sometimes portrayed in the media constituting a military alliance, in fact this agreement is aimed at facilitating joint military exercises and contains no obligation for either country to defend the other in the event of an armed attack.

It is important to emphasize that Japan’s approach to the SCS has been limited to non-confrontational and non-lethal support. While the Japanese navy has participated in joint military exercises with navies from the US, Philippines, Vietnam, and Australia in the SCS, Japan has not joined the US Navy in participating in so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) designed to challenge China’s claims to territorial waters around SCS artificial islands it has constructed. More generally, the SDF and Japanese Coast Guard have avoided direct confrontations with their Chinese counterparts in the SCS. While Japan has used its Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget to make significant transfers of coast guard and military equipment, none of these has involved the transfer of lethal weapons. Japan’s recent creation of a new form of assistance, Official Security Assistance (OSA) will further facilitate the transfer of ISR related equipment, but Tokyo continues to avoid transferring lethal weapons to SCS littoral states.

The East China Sea Dimension

While SLOC security and balancing the rise of China more generally have been important motivations, Japan’s national interest in the ECS looms as the greatest influence on Japan’s strategy in the SCS. The emergence of a new status quo of constant confrontation between China and Japan over the Senkaku islands since 2012, as Chinese Coast Guard vessels continually enter the territorial waters around these islands, has led to a transformation in Japanese defense, culminating in the decision to increase defense spending by approximately 60% in December 2022. The shadow of the ECS can be seen in Japan’s SCS policy in three ways. First, Japan has used regional multilateralism, especially the EAMF, to influence negotiations between ASEAN and China over an envisaged Code of Conduct, for the SCS does not include norms and rules that could set a negative precedent for Japan’s position in the ECS. Second, the near constant refrain in Japan’s diplomacy since 2012 that seeks to uphold a rules-based maritime order, and identifies China as a threat to that order, is an attempt to pressure China not just in the SCS, but even in more distant maritime realms such as the Arctic, to abandon what Japan sees as coercive challenges to the status quo in the ECS. Third, Japan has used its support for littoral states such as the Philippines and Vietnam to confront China in order to divert Chinese attention and resources away from the ECS.

Finally, Japan’s priority of ensuring its continued control of the Senkaku islands, ensuring the security of the Sakishima islands, and defending sovereign rights in its claimed ECS EEZ, means that it simply lacks the capacity to play a significant military role in the SCS. Even with the 60% increase in defense spending that Japan announced in December 2022, Japan is simply too hard pressed bolstering its territorial defense in the ECS to consider a military role in the SCS or elsewhere. For this reason, among the others identified in this essay, Japan will continue to focus on multilateral diplomacy and non-lethal ISR equipment transfers as the primary means to secure its national interests and support South-China-Sea littoral states that are confronting China.