Various stakeholders in Japan’s policy community have visited Washington throughout the year to exchange views on the U.S. presidential election and the potential implications of a political transition for the U.S.-Japan alliance—understandable given that the alliance is the cornerstone of Japan’s national security. Few would have predicted earlier this year, however, that these discussions might also address political uncertainty in Japan. The ruling coalition’s weak performance in the October 27 Lower House election could generate political instability that might impact Japan’s capacity to sustain its diplomatic and strategic weight. This is a unique period in which both countries could manage political transitions simultaneously, but this need not necessarily be anxiety inducing. To paraphrase a passage traditionally included in an annual address to Congress by the President of the United States, the state of the U.S.-Japan alliance is strong, and a foundation is in place to maintain momentum for this relationship once the political dust settles in Washington and Tokyo.

Will U.S. strategy in Asia change fundamentally in 2025? A Harris administration would likely embrace President Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy centered on bilateral alliances, so-called “minilateral” networks for cooperation among like-minded countries (such as the trilateral partnership between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea), and commit to managing strategic competition with China. Japan may be concerned about the prospects for transactional diplomacy and skepticism of alliance relationships under Trump based on his first term, but the Trump administration was animated by Japan’s commitment to enhance its defense capabilities and deter China, adopted Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision as a framework for regional diplomacy, and embraced minilateralism exemplified by U.S.-Japan-Australia-India coordination under the Quad construct. (which the Biden administration elevated to the leadership level). The best evidence for a sustained U.S. commitment to Asia in either case would be meaningful increases in defense spending. But wars in Europe and the Middle East could command attention and resources, and there are growing constituencies in both American political parties calling for cuts in favor of domestic policy priorities. Japan also has homework on the defense spending front and should not allow fiscal policy debates that might surface in a tumultuous political environment to obstruct momentum for implementing its new defense strategy with enhanced U.S.-Japan military cooperation at its core. There is no reason to fret about dramatic change in Japan’s national security strategy, which is firmly established and generally supported by the public; the only question is the extent to which political instability might slow down the speed of execution. The good news is that Japan and the United States have aligned their regional and global strategies, and that bodes well for alliance cooperation heading into 2025.

Fortifying the economic pillar of the U.S.-Japan alliance could prove more arduous. Trend lines in both the Democratic and Republican parties favor industrial policy, protectionist instincts, and a distaste for multilateral trade liberalization. Japan and other U.S. allies and partners will have to champion rules and norms for economic integration in the Indo-Pacific region on their own while continuing to remind Washington that a trade strategy is critical to the credibility of U.S. rhetorical commitments to sustained leadership in regional affairs. Bilateral cooperation on economic security—namely coordinating efforts to limit China’s access to sensitive and emerging technologies—has advanced markedly, though Japan, like other frontline states, is also trying to preserve a degree of economic interdependence with Beijing and could face a dilemma if a Harris or Trump administration moves to dramatically expand the economic security agenda. Japan also faces an economic challenge of its own—the need to develop a strategy for sustainable growth. The national security strategy rightly recognizes that economic prowess is fundamental to Japan’s future vitality as a security actor, but the policy platforms released in advance of the recent Lower House election favored traditional pump-priming efforts to curry voters’ favor. That is not necessarily unique to Japan and is analogous to economic policy pronouncements in the U.S. presidential campaign. But Japan needs a more comprehensive growth strategy as the world’s fourth largest economy and a leading democracy committed to shaping the regional and global economic order.

Even though both governments will have to confront a range of policy challenges while managing contentious domestic political environments, the U.S.-Japan alliance will endure. A rapidly deteriorating security environment in Asia marked by intensifying threats from China, North Korea, and Russia amplifies the importance of alliance cooperation to deter aggression and underwrite future stability and prosperity across the region. A deep reservoir of bipartisan support for the alliance in the Congress and the Diet augurs well for legislative initiatives that reflect alliance priorities. And public opinion polls consistently recognize that the alliance supports the interests of both countries. Political transitions are often fraught with uncertainty, but there is no need to hyperventilate. The U.S.-Japan alliance is on solid ground with a detailed blueprint for new leaders to build on.